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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates how accounting conservatism affects the value-relevance of accounting 
information under different economic attributes. A firm’s value is driven by the underlying 
economics, such as its production function, investment opportunity set, and risk. The corporate life-
cycle stage can capture general differences in these underlying economics. From the perspective of 
the Feltham and Ohlson (1995)’s valuation model, this suggests that firms in different life-cycle 
stages have different financial characteristics that affect the value-relevance of the accounting 
information. Their valuation model depicts theoretically that, under conservative accounting, the 
expected growth in net operating assets affects a firm’s market valuation. This paper predicts that 
the pricing multiples of the value components of the valuation model will differ in different 
corporate life-cycle stages and accounting conservatism will have a joint effect with the life-cycle 
stage on the value-relevance of accounting information. This study conducts its hypothesis tests 
using comprehensive proxies such as conservatism estimates from the valuation model and 
corporate life-cycle stages.  These enable this study to examine the overall effects of accounting 
information, accounting conservatism as well as economic attributes on firm value. According to 
those comprehensive proxies, sample firms are classified into two conservatism groups, and three 
life-cycle stages. The results of this study provide evidence that accounting conservatism has a joint 
effect with the life-cycle stage on the value-relevance of accounting information.   
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 primary objective of financial reporting is to provide relevant and reliable information to interested 
third parties (Financial Accounting Standards Board [1978]). Financial reports are a means that 
managers use to communicate operating results and financial conditions of the firm to interested 
parties external to the firm. Users can then utilize this information to evaluate the performance and financial condition 
of the firm for investment decisions, fiduciary purposes, or other uses. However, not all firms reporting the same 
operating results and/or financial conditions have the same or similar market values. Other factors are likely to lead 
market values to differ among firms with similar operating results and financial conditions. Prior research suggests that 
accounting measurement rules and economic attributes play important roles in firm valuation using financial 
accounting numbers (Anthony and Ramesh [1992], Ahmed, Morton, and Schaefer [2000], and Penman and Zhang 
[2002]). 
 
Feltham and Ohlson [1995] propose a theoretical firm valuation model suggesting that accounting 
conservatism plays important roles in firm valuations. In its conceptual framework, the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board [1980] identifies conservatism as one of the constraints on information usefulness. Few empirical 
studies (Stober [1996], Basu [1997], and Ahmed et al. [2000]) have investigated the effect of accounting conservatism 
on firm valuation. However, each of these studies investigated only limited aspects of accounting conservatism and 
focus only on a simple relationship between accounting conservatism and firm value. Other factors may affect firm 
values. The current economic attributes of a firm are likely to have an impact on the firm’s choice of accounting 
A 
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measurement rules, and consequently its level of conservatism in its financial reports. For example, in the oil and gas 
industry, firms that use the Full Cost approach for exploration costs have been categorized as smaller, more highly 
leveraged, and younger than firms that use the Successful Efforts approach (Lilien and Pastena [1982]). Since prior 
studies on accounting conservatism have not considered other factors that may affect firm values, the role that 
accounting conservatism plays in firm valuations is yet to be established. Therefore, further investigation is necessary 
on the effect of accounting conservatism on firm values, given differences in economic attributes. 
 
Using the Feltham and Ohlson [1995]’s valuation model (henceforth, FO model), this study examines (1) the 
effects of life-cycle stages on firm valuations and (2) the joint effects of accounting conservatism and life-cycle stages 
on firm valuations. Based on prior studies and the FO model, this study expects that the pricing multiples of the value 
components of the FO model will be different in different life-cycle stages and accounting conservatism will have a 
joint effect with the life-cycle stage on the value-relevance of accounting information. This study uses a pooled cross-
sectional time-series regression model to test the hypotheses. For the measure of firms’ choices of accounting 
measurement rules, this study uses the conservatism estimate generated using the FO model. Life-cycle stages as 
defined by Black [1998] are used as a surrogate for firms’ economic attributes. Sample firms are classified into two 
conservatism groups (CONSERVATIVE and AGGRESSIVE) and three life-cycle stages (GROWTH, MATURE and 
DECLINE). The results of this study show that the equity market processes accounting information differently for 
firms at different life-cycle stages. Furthermore, the choice of conservative accounting measurements in reporting 
financial results affects the relationship between life-cycle stages and firm values. 
 
ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM AND CORPORATE LIFE-CYCLE 
 
A conservative accounting practice is likely to create “hidden reserves” and, in turn, generate higher expected 
future firm values in the long run (Penman and Zhang [2002]). Therefore, it is expected that companies applying 
conservative accounting practices will be valued higher by investors than companies following less conservative 
accounting practices. Stober [1996] and Ahmed et al. [2000], using FO valuation model, find that investors attach 
larger weights to abnormal earnings and net operating assets of firms following conservative accounting practices than 
those following less conservative practices. In addition, Ahmed et al. [2000] find that there are significant associations 
between proxies for conservative accounting procedures and the earnings persistence and conservatism multiples in the 
FO valuation model.
1
 Abarbanell and Bushee [1998], and Lev and Thiagarajan [1993] use the inventory costing 
method (LIFO or FIFO) as a proxy for the quality of accounting numbers in testing the informativeness of fundamental 
signals. They find that the choice of conservative accounting measurements in reporting financial results affects the 
market revisions on the firm’s future earnings. In their firm valuation model, Feltham and Ohlson [1995] view 
accounting conservatism as a market expectation that the reported value of net assets of a firm will be less than the true 
economic value of the firm’s net assets.2 In the context of Feltham and Ohlson [1995]’s valuation model, this paper 
defines accounting conservatism as the extent to which net operating assets are persistently understated relative to their 
economic values. 
 
Since firms at different life-cycle stages have different economic characteristics, life-cycle stage has been 
used by financial analysts and academic researchers to describe economic attributes of a firm. The literature on life-
cycle suggests that (1) life-cycle stages can explain differences in underlying economics of value-relevant attributes 
such as production function and investment opportunity set, (2) firms at different life-cycle stages need to manage 
business differently to be successful, and (3) awareness of a firm’s specific life-cycle stage can gain understanding of 
where the firm has been and where the firm is going. These understanding can, in turn, help investors to obtain better 
evaluations of the firm (Lee and Nakicenovic [1988], Anthony and Ramesh [1992], and Black [1998]).
3
 Prior research 
provides evidences that informativeness of accounting measures differ at different stages of a firm’s life cycle. Rao 
[1989] finds that the informativeness of unexpected earnings changes as a function of firm age. Anthony and Ramesh 
[1992] find firms at an early life-cycle stage (or growth stage) have a higher stock price reaction to unexpected 
positive sales growth and capital expenditure than firms at a later life-cycle stage (or decline stage). Gaver and Gaver 
[1993] point out that variation in the investment opportunity set leads to different corporate financing, dividend, and 
compensation policies. They found that growth firms use lower leverage, pay lower dividend, and use more stock-
based incentive compensation than firms at other life-cycle stages. Amir and Lev [1996] show that financial 
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accounting data are not informative about the future performance of early stage growth firms in the 
telecommunications industry. Black [1998] find the incremental information content of earnings and cash flows varies 
with life-cycle stages. However, lacking a model that offers a directional relation between accounting measures and 
life-cycle stage, prior research has tested the accounting implications of life-cycle intuitively.  
 
Several analytical and empirical studies have examined the relationship between firms’ economic attributes 
and accounting procedure choices. Watts and Zimmerman [1986, 1990] focus on earnings management and suggest 
that a firm’s debt level affects manager’s accounting procedure choices. Skinner [1993] provides evidence on the 
relation between firms’ investment opportunities and accounting procedure choices. However, these studies find only 
limited evidences on the direct relationship between firms’ economic attributes and accounting procedure choices 
because they argue that accounting procedure choices is directly attributable to debt levels and/or compensation 
contracts and firms’ economic attributes affect accounting procedure choices only indirectly through debt levels and/or 
compensation contracts. This study examines the roles of operating earnings and net operating assets on equity 
valuation in the context of FO valuation model and investigates the implication of corporate life-cycle in a firm’s 
market valuation. In addition, if investors perceive high inherent uncertainty about a firm’s future cash flows for firms 
at an early growth stage or a late decline stage, then conservative accounting practices, which are presumed to 
minimize the subjective intervention of managers to measure accounting numbers, increase credibility of accounting 
data to investors.   
 
HYOPTHESIS DEVEMLOPMENT 
 
Accounting data can affect a firm’s strategic decisions. Strategic decisions guide business activities (i.e., 
financial and operating activities) that change firm values. Studies on life-cycle show that the effectiveness of business 
activities in creating firm value varies with the life-cycle stage of the firm. Firms at different life-cycle stages often 
have different economic characteristics and firms at the same life-cycle stage often share similar economic 
characteristics (Anthony and Ramesh [1992], and Black [1998]). Both business activities of a firm and its economic 
characteristics, as represented by life-cycle stages, are important explanatory variables on the operating results 
reflected in financial statements, and the perceived future abnormal operating earning streams that determine firm 
value. 
 
In addition to having an important role in equity valuation, accounting variables also convey information 
guiding strategic decisions and determining business activities. Both strategic decision and business activities underlie 
the creation of firm value.
4
 Even if two firms report the same accounting values, market reactions to their accounting 
measures can differ because of the differences in their economic attributes. Thus, it is important for a valuation model 
that considers the effect of firms’ behavior in choosing business activities to incorporate these firms’ economic 
characteristics. For instance, a firm at a growth stage may choose to expand even if the firm is not profitable, and 
another firm at a declining stage may choose to discontinue its operation even though the firm is making a handsome 
profit. In this setting, it is assumed that (1) both accounting variables and economic characteristics as represented by 
life-cycle are important determinants of a firm’s strategic decisions and (2) investors value the expected future 
abnormal operating earnings to be produced from business activities.
5
 
 
If the accounting system uses historical cost, a firm at a growth life-cycle stage should, on average, earn more 
than its cost of capital. Because a firm’s investment projects have positive expected net present values (NPV) and the 
firm enjoys mark-up of its operating assets and equity, the firm will command positive abnormal operating earnings. 
Investors would place a positive weight on operating assets in evaluating firm values if they perceive the firm to be at a 
growth stage. According to the FO valuation model, the pricing multiples on operating earnings and net operating 
assets change as a firm proceeds through its life-cycle stages over time. Given that equity valuations relating to life-
cycle stage, this paper hypothesizes that both operating earnings and net operating assets will have higher pricing 
multiples for firms at a growth stage than firms at other life-cycle stages. Based on the FO model, this paper tests the 
following hypothesis:  
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H1: Investors place higher multiples on both abnormal operating earnings and operating assets for firms at growth 
stage than firms at mature or declining stage. 
 
This paper defines accounting conservatism as an accounting practice, applied consistently over time, that 
keeps the book value of net operating assets low.
6
 The practice needs to be consistently applied over periods to 
distinguish it from temporary manipulations of accounting principles or accounting estimates to manage the reported 
earning. Examples of temporary manipulations of accounting are underestimations of valuation reserve for deferred tax 
assets or doubtful accounts to inflate earnings temporarily and overestimations of restructuring charges to reduce 
earnings temporarily.
7
 In the FO valuation framework, growth in investment is irrelevant if and only if the accounting 
is unbiased.
8
 Therefore, given a conservative accounting policy consistently applied over time, the market value of a 
firm’s equity hinges on expected growth in investment in conjunction with other value-relevant accounting 
components. Conservative accounting implies that a firm has “hidden reserves” for future profits and hence the firm is 
likely to be rewarded for high growth in its net operating assets.
9
   
 
Penman and Zhang [1999] demonstrate the interaction between conservative accounting and growth in 
investment with the cases of following accounting practices. Increases in LIFO reserve (layer) raise hidden reserves, 
and declines in the LIFO reserve (i.e., LIFO dipping) reduce hidden reserves. Similar results can be found in other 
accounting practices. Accelerated depreciation has no effect on net operating assets and earnings if there is no growth 
in fixed assets investment, but it reduces net operating assets and earnings (and creates hidden reserves) if investment 
in the fixed assets increases, ceteris paribus. If investments in the fixed assets decline, accelerated depreciation creates 
earnings through the liquidation of hidden reserves. Immediate expensing of R&D expenditures and advertising are 
conservative accounting practices. However, they have no effect on earnings relative to capitalizing and amortizing of 
the expenditures if these expenditures are not growing. In contrast, changes in R&D or advertising investments with 
immediate expensing create hidden reserves. 
 
In summary, conservative accounting practices applied consistently over time reduce contemporaneous 
earnings for firms with increases in investments. However, the market would likely assign high weights to the reduced 
earnings because of the increased hidden reserves that have potentials for higher future earnings from the reserves. On 
the other hand, a firm following conservative accounting can increase current earnings by reducing investments (or the 
rate of growth in investments), which makes the current earnings a poor indicator of future earnings. The market would 
likely assign low weights to the temporarily increasing earnings because of the decreased hidden reserves. To the 
extent that the joint effect of accounting policy and investment activity on hidden reserve or earnings is correctly 
interpreted by investors in pricing a firm’s equity, the expected growth in operating assets along with accounting 
conservatism provides relevant information about the expected future value of the firm.
10
 Given the abundance of 
information, including both accounting and non-accounting information, investors have information to evaluate the 
effects of accounting conservatism on net operating assets, estimate the expected growth in investments, and assess 
joint effects of accounting conservatism and growth on the firms’ expected abnormal operating earnings.11 Therefore, 
this leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: A growth firm perceived as following conservative accounting practices by investors has a higher multiple on 
its abnormal operating earnings and/or operating assets than that of a growth firm perceived as following 
aggressive accounting practices. 
 
H2b: Mature firms with differences in accounting practices have similar multiples on their abnormal operating 
earnings and/or operating assets. 
 
H2c: A declining firm perceived as following conservative accounting practices by investors has a lower multiple 
on its abnormal operating earnings and/or operating assets than that of a declining firm perceived as following 
aggressive accounting practices.   
 
 
 
Journal of Applied Business Research – Third Quarter 2006                                                      Volume 22, Number 3 
 79 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
This study uses a pooled cross-sectional and time-series regression model to test the hypotheses.  For the measure of 
firms’ choices of accounting measurement rules, this study uses the conservatism estimate generated using the FO 
model. Life-cycle stages as defined by Black [1998] are used as a surrogate for firms’ economic attributes. This paper 
uses the following FO models to test the hypotheses: 
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where git = unrecorded goodwill per share (i.e., ititit bvpg   where p is stock price and bv is book value) for 
firm i at year t, 
 
ox
a
it = abnormal operating earning per share of firm i at year t, 
oait = net operating assets per share of firm i at year t, 
w1 = persistence in abnormal operating earnings per share, 
w2 = accounting conservatism in operating assets per share,  
α1 = pricing multiple on abnormal operating earnings, 
α2 = pricing multiple on net operating assets, and 
it = random error term for firm i at year t. 
 
Equation (1) suggests that the expected future abnormal earnings are affected by both current abnormal 
earnings and operating assets. The weight on net operating assets (w2) represents the effect of conservatism on the 
expected future abnormal earnings. Firms using conservative accounting are likely to systematically understate their 
current operating assets.  As a result, a firm following conservative accounting choices might have an economic 
potential to produce large abnormal earnings (relative to its stated net operating assets) in the future. The coefficients 
of two explanatory variables in equation (2), ox
a
it and oait, indicate the persistence of abnormal earnings and the 
conservatism of operating assets respectively (Feltham and Ohlson [1995]).  The effect of accounting conservatism on 
firm values is tested using equation (2). 
 
Based on life-cycle stage indicators used in Anthony and Ramesh [1992], and Black [1998], this paper 
classifies sample firm-year into GROWTH, MATURE and DECLINE life-cycle stages.
12
  The life-cycle stage 
indicators are capital expenditures, dividend payout ratio, sales growth percentage, and firm age. Each firm-specific 
indicator is calculated each year for each of the sample firms. The firm-specific indicator for each firm-year is 
compared with the industry quintiles of indicator for the same year to assign a score of 1 to 5 for each of the firm-
year.
13
  Each firm-year is classified into a life-cycle stage based on a composite score obtained by summing the 
individual indicator scores. Testing of the second hypothesis is performed using the pooled cross-sectional and time-
series regression with intercept and slope dummy variables for different life-cycle stages with the following regression 
equation: 
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a
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where Dm  = dummy variable which is 1 for mature firm-year and 0 otherwise, and 
Dd  = dummy variable which is 1 for decline firm-year and 0 otherwise. 
 
Consistent with the first research hypothesis, the predictions in alternative form are as follows: 
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H1: 1 < 0; 1 < 0, and/or  
2 < 0; 2 < 0 
 
To examine the joint effects of conservatism and life-cycle stage on the market reaction to valuation 
multiples, all firm-years in each life-cycle stage is divided into “CONSERVATIVE” and “AGGRESSIVE” strata by 
calculating the firm-specific average estimates of conservatism from the equation (1). To test the joint effects of 
accounting conservatism and life-cycle stage on firm valuation (hypotheses H3a, H3b, andH3c), this paper tests the 
following regression equation for each life-cycle stage group: 
 
ititkl
a
itklklitl
a
itllit oaDoxDDoaoxg   210210   (5) 
 
where l  = g for GROWTH firms, m for MATURE firms and d for DECLINE firms, and 
Dk  = dummy variable which is 1 for AGGRESSIVE firms and 0 otherwise.  
 
The pooled cross-sectional and time-series regression model is formulated as above in order to permit the 
intercept and coefficients to vary across the different level of accounting conservatism.   
 
The figure 1 shows the partitioning scheme for the second hypothesis. In equation (5) and figure 1, 0l, 1l 
and 2l (where l = g for GROWTH firms, m for MATURE firms and d for DECLINE firms) represent the intercept, 
persistence coefficient, and conservatism coefficient, respectively, for CONSERVATIVE firms. For the 
AGGRESSIVE firms, the intercept, the persistence, and conservatism coefficients are 0l + 0l, 1l + 1l and 2l + 2l, 
respectively. Hence, 0l, 1l and 2l represent the differences in the intercepts and coefficients between 
CONSERVATIVE firms and AGGRESSIVE firms. Consistent with the second research hypothesis, the predictions in 
alternative form are as follows: 
 
H2a: 1g < 0 and/or 2g < 0. 
 
H2b: 1m = 0 and/or 2m = 0. 
 
H2c: 1d > 0 and/or 2d > 0. 
 
 
Figure 1: Coefficients for each Sample Stratum for Hypothesis H2 
 
Life-Cycle Stage 
Growth Mature Decline 
Conservative Aggressive Conservative Aggressive Conservative Aggressive 
0g 
1g 
0g + 0g 
1g + 1g 
0m 
1m 
0m + 0m 1m + 
1m 
0d 
1d 
0d + 0d 
1d + 1d 
ititkl
a
itklklitl
a
itllit eoaDoxDDoaoxg  210210   
 
where   l  = g for GROWTH firms, m for MATURE firms and d for DECLINE firms, and 
Dk  = dummy variable which is 1 for AGGRESSIVE firms and 0 otherwise  
 
 
MEASUREMENT DESCRIPTORS 
 
This study measures the firm-specific level of accounting conservatism by calculating the firm-specific 
average estimates of conservatism from the equation (1) over a four-year period preceding the event year.
14
 FO [1995] 
define that a firm’s accounting of operating assets to be conservative if the conservatism coefficient is a positive, 
unbiased if zero, and aggressive if negative. To examine the effect of conservatism on the market reaction to valuation 
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multiples, the sample is divided into CONSERVATIVE” and “AGGRESSIVE” strata. This study examines the 
relative conservatism to the industry median conservatism, which investors are assumed to do when they make 
investment decisions. The firm-specific average estimate of conservatism is compared with the industry median 
estimate, which is calculated from the equation (1) using all the firms with the same two-digit SIC code as the target 
firm. If the firm-specific conservatism coefficient is greater than the industry median coefficient, then the sample firm 
is categorized as “CONSERVATIVE,” otherwise “AGGRESSIVE.”15 
 
To test the hypothesized relationships, sample firm-years are selected from the either COMPUSTAT PC Plus 
Active or Research data sets during 1982 through 1993 and classified into two conservatism groups 
(CONSERVATIVE and AGGRESSIVE) and three life-cycle stages (GROWTH, MATURE and DECLINE). To 
classify sample firm-years into life-cycle stages, this study uses the following four classification variables commonly 
used in prior research on life-cycle (Anthony and Ramesh [1992], and Black [1998]): age of the firm (AGE), percent 
sales growth (SG), capital expenditure divided by total value of the firm (CE), and annual dividend payout divided by 
net income (DP). AGE variables are obtained from Moody’s Industrial Manuals and computed as the difference 
between the current year and the earliest year of incorporation for each firm-year.
16
 Other financial variables are 
computed using data from COMPUSTAT as follows: 
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where SALES = net sales (#12), 
 CEXP = capital expenditure (#128), 
VALUE = market value of equity (#24  #25), 
DIV = common stock dividends (#21), and 
IBED = income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#18).
 17
 
 
These life-cycle classification variables are expected to signal differences in strategic emphases of firms in 
each of the life-cycle stages (Anthony and Ramesh [1992], and Black [1998]).
18
 For example, younger firms are more 
likely to have new technology or products (Pashley and Philippatos [1990]). Firms with high sales growth are typically 
in the early phase of firm development and have high growth opportunities. Firms in early life-cycle stages, on 
average, invest large amounts in plants and equipment. Low dividend payout is usually associated with early life-cycle 
stages because firms need cash to, among others, meet operating needs and pay for capital expenditures. In general, 
firms in early life-cycle stages, on average, exhibit higher sales growth, larger capital expenditures, and lower dividend 
payout ratios (Black [1998]). 
 
A mature stage firm is characterized by mature product markets and considerable competition (Anthony and 
Ramesh [1992], and Black [1998]). Sales growth stagnates and market share remains unchanged or declines due to 
market competition. High levels of liquidity accumulate from past investments while new investments are limited. 
Hence, firms at mature stage are likely paying high dividends. Also, firms at the mature stage usually have excess 
capacity, and any further investment in capacity is likely to result in reduced profitability. As a result, firms at the 
mature stage are less likely to incur large capital expenditure. At decline stage, demand for the firm’s products dies 
away, sales drop off significantly, losses are likely to occur, and dividends cease (Anthony and Ramesh [1992], and 
Black [1998]). The firm may pursue divesture to improve liquidity and maintain dividends rather than invest in plant 
and equipment. 
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SAMPLE SELECTION 
 
The sample firm-years are selected for the period 1982 through 1993 that satisfy the following sampling 
criteria
19
: 
 
1. Sample firms should have the requisite accounting data and stock price data available from either 
COMPUSTAT PC Plus Active or Research data sets.
20
 
2. Firms with SIC codes from 6000 to 6999 are excluded from the sample because these firms are financial 
firms, which are subject to regulatory requirements that are likely to affect the relation between market values 
and accounting numbers (Ahmed et al. [2000]). 
3. Firm-years with abnormal operating earnings or operating assets which fell within the 1st and 99th percentiles 
are excluded from sample to mitigate the effects of extreme values. 
4. Each sample firm-year can be classified into “CONSERVATIVE” and “AGGRESSIVE” strata by comparing 
the firm-specific average estimate of conservatism with the industry median estimate, which is calculated 
from the equation (1) using all the COPUSTAT firms having the same two-digit SIC code as the target firm. 
 
 
Figure 2: Score Assignment to Industry Quintile 
 
Industry Quintile Life-Cycle Descriptors 
AGE SG CE DP 
80%-100% 1 5 5 3 
60%-80% 2 4 4 3 
40%-60% 3 3 3 3 
20%-40% 4 2 2 4 (2)* 
0%-20% 5 1 1 5 (1)* 
Note: * If the sum of scores for AGE, SG, and CE is low (i.e., smaller than 7.5), and DP is at the lowest (second lowest) 
quintile, then one (two) is assigned as the DP score for decline stage firm-years. 
 
 
 Using multiple life-cycle stage descriptors (i.e., AGE, SG, CE, and DP), this study classifies sample firms 
meeting the above criteria into life cycle stages (GROWTH, MATURE, and DECLINE) as follows:
21
 
 
1. The four life-cycle stage descriptors (i.e., AGE, SG, CE, and DP) are calculated for each event year (i.e., 
relative-year 0) for each sample firm-year. 
2. Industry quintiles are calculated for each of the descriptors for each event year using all the COMPUSTAT 
firms having the same two-digit SIC code as the target firm. 
3. The four classification variable observations for each firm-year are assigned to each industry quintile of the 
same variable and they are given a score as shown in figure 2.
22
 In figure 2, the composite score ranges from 
four to twenty. A low dividend payout could signal either high growth opportunities or liquidity problems. 
While a decline stage firm with liquidity problems would exhibit a low dividend payout, the firm is unlikely 
to be in the high quintile on the sales growth or capital expenditures variables. Therefore, if the sum of the 
scores for AGE, SG and CE is low (i.e., smaller than 7), and score for DP is five (four), then one (two) is 
assigned as DP score for decline stage firm-years. 
4. Each sample firm-year is classified into life-cycle stages using the following procedure: (1) A firm-year is 
classified as a “GROWTH” stage observation if its composite score is between sixteen and twenty. (2) A 
firm-year is classified as a “MATURE” stage observation if its composite score is between nine and fifteen.   
5. A firm-year is classified as a “DECLINE” stage observation if its composite score is between four and eight.23 
 
 Table 1 shows the sample selection criteria (Panel A), the sample frequency in each event year (Panel B), and 
in each accounting conservatism classification (Panel C) across the different life-cycle strata of sample firm-years. 
Table 2 reports the industry composition for the 713 firms that met data requirements. Not all industries have 
approximately equal member of firms included in the sample. Sample has a higher number of firms in the Retail Trade 
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and Natural Gas Pipelines industries, and a lower number of firms in the Automotive, Diversified Companies, 
Construction industries. To control for industry effects, this study classifies sample firms into CONSERVATIVE and 
AGGRESSIVE strata, and GROWTH, MATURE and DECLINE strata by calculating the firm-specific average 
estimates of conservatism and life-cycle stage and comparing these with the industry medians. Firms are considered to 
be in the same industry if they have the same two-digit SIC code. 
 
 
Table 1: Sample Selection 
 
Panel A : Sample Selection Process (Number of firm-years) 
 EXPANDED UNCHANGED REDUCED Total 
1. Firms with individual scores in the 
relevant industries 
--- --- --- 1627 
2. Firms with consecutive scores --- --- --- 1492 
3. Firms with top, middle or bottom 
two deciles 
299 298 298 895 
4. Firms with COMPUSTAT data 
available 
277 281 275 833 
5. Non financial firms 247 250 242 739 
6. Firms after excluding outliers 238 244 231 713 
7.  Firms with life-cycle descriptor data 233 236 225 694 
 
Panel B : Conservative and Aggressive Firm-Years across Life-Cycle Stages 
 GROWTH MATURE DECLINE Total 
CONSERVATIVE 83 (54.3%) 173 (54.7%) 135 (59.7%) 391 (56.3%) 
AGGRESSIVE 70 (45.7%) 143 (45.3%) 91 (40.3%) 303 (43.7%) 
Total 153 (100%) 316 (100%) 226 (100%) 694 (100%) 
 
Panel C : Year Composition of Firm-Years across Life-Cycle Stages 
 GROWTH MATURE DECLINE Total 
1984 12 (7.8%) 28 (8.9%) 38 (16.8%) 78 (11.2%) 
1985 13 (8.5%) 29 (9.2%) 25 (11.1%) 67 (9.7%) 
1986 17 (11.1%) 38 (12.1%) 26 (11.5%) 81 (11.7%) 
1987 16 (10.5%) 32 (10.2%) 24 (10.6%) 72 (10.4%) 
1988 22 (14.4%) 43 (13.7%) 28 (12.4%) 93 (13.4%) 
1989 18 (11.8%) 37 (11.7%) 27 (11.9%) 82 (11.8%) 
1990 31 (20.3%) 52 (16.5%) 31 (13.7%) 114 (16.4%) 
1991 24 (15.7%) 56 (17.8%) 27 (11.9%) 107 (15.4%) 
Total 153 (100%) 315 (100%) 226 (100%) 694 (100%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Applied Business Research – Third Quarter 2006                                                      Volume 22, Number 3 
 84 
Table 2: Industry Composition for Sample Firms 
 
Industry No. of Firms Percent 
Aerospace 26 3.6% 
Airline 21 2.9% 
Apparel 39 5.5% 
Automotive 6 0.8% 
Chemical 31 4.3% 
Construction 8 1.1% 
Containers and Packaging 18 2.5% 
Diversified Companies 7 1.0% 
Domestic Oil Refining 44 6.2% 
Drilling and Oil 31 4.3% 
Electrical Equipment 32 4.5% 
Environmental Control 14 2.0% 
Food, Beverage, and Tobacco 12 1.7% 
Machinery 48 6.7% 
Motor Carrier 40 5.6% 
Natural Gas Distribution 33 4.6% 
Natural Gas Pipelines 59 8.3% 
Paper and Forest Products 23 3.2% 
Publishing and Broadcasting 43 6.0% 
Railroad 22 3.1% 
Retail Trade 74 10.4% 
Specialty Chemical 48 6.7% 
Telecommunications 16 2.2% 
Textiles 18 2.5% 
Total 713 100% 
 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The variables used in the empirical models and their definitions are as follows:
24
 
 
1. p: Stock price at the end of three months following the firm’s fiscal year-end. 
2. g: Unrecorded goodwill which is measured as stock price minus book value of equity (#60). 
3. oa: Operating assets which are measured as book value of equity minus cash and marketable securities (#1) 
and other investments and advances (#32), plus short term debt (#34), long term debt (#9), preferred stock 
(#130), and minority interest (#38). 
4. ox: Operating earnings which are measured as income before extraordinary items (#18) minus interest income 
(#62) plus interest expense (#15), preferred dividends (#19), and minority interest (#49).
25 
 
 
This paper follows the variable definitions of Stober [1995] who views preferred stock and minority interest 
as debt, while treating deferred taxes and net pension assets as net operating assets. All variables used in the FO model 
are scaled by common shares outstanding (#25) to reduce possible size effects. Table 3 shows summary statistics for 
the FO valuation model on the relation between the unrecorded goodwill and abnormal earnings and operating assets 
for the entire sample firms. The average multiple on abnormal operating earnings, 1, is 3.416, as compared to 5.215 
in Ahmed et al. [2000]. The average coefficient on operating assets, 2, is 0.07 which is smaller than Stober [1996]’s 
0.22 and Ahmed et al. [2000]’s 0.41. Panel B of Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients between 
unrecorded goodwill, abnormal operating earnings, and operating assets. The unrecorded goodwill (Gt) and abnormal 
operating earnings (OX
a
t) are significantly positively correlated at the significance level of 0.01. However, operating 
assets are not significantly associated with the unrecorded goodwill. There is a significant association between the 
abnormal operating earnings and operating assets. This association may introduce multicollinearity into the model 
estimation. This study examines the condition index, and fails to find any multicollinearity problems.
26
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Table 3: Estimation of Persistence, Conservatism, and Valuation Multiples over the Overall Period (n = 3565) 
 
Panel A : Estimation of persistence and conservatism 
 Mean Std.    
oxat 0.133 2.145    
oxat-1 0.117 2.114    
oat-1 21.199 18.538    
OXat = w0 + w1OX
a
t-1 + w2OAt-1 + et 
 
Coeff. Estimate Std. t-statistic p value Adj. R2 
w0 0.696 0.048 14.535 0.000 0.246 
w1 0.401 0.015 26.908 0.000  
w2 -0.029 0.002 -16.934 0.000  
 
Pearson Correlation 
 ox
a
t ox
a
t-1 oat-1 
oxat 1.000 0.431 -0.305 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
oxat-1  1.000 -0.141 
   (0.000) 
oat-1   1.000 
Variables are defined as follows: 
gt = Unrecorded goodwill per share at the 3 months after the balance sheet date t. 
oxat = Abnormal operating assets per share at the balance sheet date t. 
oat = Operating assets per share at the balance sheet date t. 
Note:  t-statistics are tested at the significance level of 0.05 using two-tailed tests. 
 
Panel B : Estimation of valuation multiples 
 Mean Std.   
gt 11.976 15.495   
oxat 0.133 2.145   
oat 22.521 19.288   
 
Coeff. Estimate Std. t-statistic p value 
0 9.945 0.358 27.808 0.000 
1 3.416 0.108 31.505 0.000 
2 0.070 0.012 5.807 0.000 
 
  ox
a
t 
gt 1.000 0.459 
  (0.000) 
oxat  1.000 
   
oat   
 
Variables are defined as follows: 
gt = Unrecorded goodwill per share at the 3 months after the balance sheet date t. 
oxat = Abnormal operating assets per share at the balance sheet date t. 
oat = Operating assets per share at the balance sheet date t. 
Note:  t-statistics are tested at the significance level of 0.05 using two-tailed tests. 
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
To test the first hypothesis (H1), the sample that met the data requirements (694 firms) is divided into 
GROWTH, MATURE, and DECLINE strata by comparing each life-cycle indicator with the industry quintiles of the 
indicator in the same year. Equation (4) is tested to examine whether the value-relevance of abnormal operating 
earnings and operating assets differ across life-cycle stages. The test results are shown in Table 4 and figure 3. Figure 
3 shows that the changes of the persistence and the conservatism coefficients of GROWTH firms are higher than those 
of MATURE firms and those of DECLINE firms. The market confers higher multiples to GROWTH firms’ abnormal 
earnings and net operating assets than to firms at other life-cycle stages. Table 4 shows that the marginal effects of 
MATURE stratum are significantly negative (1 = – 4.994 and 2 = –.249), and those of DECLINE stratum are 
negatively associated (1 = – 1.781 and 2 = –.237). However, the effect on abnormal operating earnings for DECLINE 
firms, 1, is not significant, indicating that the value-relevance of abnormal operating earnings and operating assets 
differs for firms at different life-cycle stages. These findings suggest that investors form beliefs about the effectiveness 
of business activities based on the firm’s life-cycle stage and value the expected future abnormal operating earnings to 
be produced from business activities accordingly. The results also coincide with the FO model’s valuation framework 
in that expected growth affects the firm value. 
 
 
Figure 3: The Effect of Corporate Life-Cycle on Valuation Multiples 
 
To examine the joint effects of conservatism and life-cycle stage on market reactions to valuation multiples, 
firms at each life-cycle stage sample are divided into “CONSERVATIVE” and “AGGRESSIVE” strata based on the 
relative positions by calculating the firm-specific average estimates of conservatism using Linear Information Model, 
equation (1), to the industry medians of all the firms that have the same two-digit SIC code. Equation (5) is tested 
across life-cycle stages to examine whether accounting conservatism affects the association between the life-cycle 
stage and firm valuation. The test results are shown in Table 5 and Figure 4. Figure 4 shows that the choice of 
accounting measurement rules affect firm values differently at different life-cycle stages. For firms at growth stage the 
persistence and conservatism coefficients of CONSERVATIVE firms are higher than those of AGGRESSIVE firms. 
For MATURE firms, the choice of accounting measurement rules is not likely to affect the value-relevance of 
abnormal earnings and net operating assets. The differences between the persistence and conservatism coefficients of 
CONSERVATIVE firms and those of AGGRESSIVE firms are smaller than those of firms at other life-cycle stages. 
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However, at decline stage the persistence and conservatism coefficients of CONSERVATIVE firms are lower than 
those of AGGRESSIVE firms. 
 
The results in Table 5 show that the marginal effects of less conservative accounting policies on both 
abnormal operating earnings and operating assets are significantly negative (i.e., 1g = – 3.453 and 2g = – .304), 
indicating that investors price the GROWTH firms using conservative accounting practices higher than those using 
less conservative practices. The result suggests that investors bestow higher multiples on abnormal operating earnings 
and/or operating assets to firms perceived as conservative than the amounts they grant to aggressive firms.
27
 The 
results of the effects of accounting conservatism for MATURE firms show that the marginal effects of aggressive 
accounting policies on operating assets is significantly negative (i.e., 2m = – .136), indicating that the market prices 
higher the operating assets for conservative firms as expected. However, the marginal effect of accounting 
conservatism on abnormal operating earnings is not significant, indicating that investors do not price the effects of 
accounting conservatism on the wealth-creating factor as represented by abnormal operating earnings if they believe 
that the firm is at the mature stage. A firm at a mature stage is not likely to make many new investments and, as a result, 
the hidden reserve accumulated from accounting conservatism is likely to remain unchanged and not value-relevant for 
the future abnormal operating earnings. 
 
 
Table 4: The Effect of Life-Cycle Stages on the Relation between Unrecorded 
Goodwill and Abnormal Earnings and Operating Assets for 694 Firm-years in the Period 1984 to 1991. 
 
gt = 0 + 1ox
a
t + 2oat + 0Dm + 1Dmox
a
t + 2Dmoat + 0Dd + 1Ddox
a
t + 2Ddoat + et 
PERIOD Number Coeff. Est. Std. t-stat. p Adj R2 
1984 - 1991 694 0 3.328 1.491 2.232 0.026 0.249 
  1 6.626 1.027 6.45 0.000  
  2 0.341 0.043 7.944 0.000  
  0 5.840 1.807 3.232 0.001  
  1 -4.994 1.069 -4.672 0.000  
  2 -0.249 0.047 -5.295 0.000  
  0 2.909 2.246 1.295 0.196  
  1 -1.781 1.305 -1.365 0.173  
  2 -0.237 0.084 -2.823 0.005  
Variables are defined as follows: 
gt = Unrecorded goodwill per share at the 3 months after the balance sheet date t. 
oxat = Abnormal operating earnings per share at the balance sheet date t. 
oat = Operating assets per share at the balance sheet date t.  
Dm = Dummy variable which is 1 for the firm-years in mature life-cycle, and 0 otherwise. 
Dd = Dummy variable which is 1 for the firm-years in decline life-cycle, and 0 otherwise. 
Note:  t-statistics are tested at the significance level of 0.05 using two-tailed tests. 
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Figure 4: The Effect of Conservatism and Life-cycle Stage on Valuation Multiples 
 
 
On the other hand, the results of the effect of accounting conservatism for DECLINE firms show that the 
marginal effects of less conservative accounting policies on both abnormal earnings and operating assets are 
significantly positive, which indicates that abnormal operating earnings and operating assets of DECLINE firms using 
conservative accounting policies are not value-relevant, and that investors price the DECLINE firms using less 
conservative accounting practices higher than those using conservative practices. 
 
 
Table 5: The Effect Of Accounting Conservatism On The Relation Between Unrecorded Goodwill 
And Abnormal Earnings And Operating Assets Across Life-Cycle Stages For 694 Firm-Years In The Period 1984 To 1991 
 
GROWTH (n = 153) MATURE (n = 316) DECLINE ( n = 226) 
Coeff. Est. Std. t-stat. p Adj R2 Est. Std. t-stat. p Adj R2 Est. Std. t-stat. p Adj R2 
0 4.233 1.415 2.992 0.003 0.657 9.799 1.711 5.726 0.000 0.095 7.773 1.400 5.553 0.000 0.350 
1 7.232 0.878 8.241 0.000  1.510 0.466 3.243 0.001  3.223 0.876 3.679 0.000  
2 0.353 0.034 10.51 0.000  0.121 0.029 4.101 0.000  -0.006 0.059 -0.954 0.341  
0 3.433 2.746 1.250 0.213  0.192 2.62 0.073 0.942  -2.820 2.219 -1.271 0.205  
1 -3.453 1.740 -1.985 0.049  1.080 0.809 1.335 0.183  2.192 1.084 2.022 0.044  
2 -0.304 0.112 -2.717 0.007  -0.136 0.054 -2.499 0.013  0.366 0.095 3.858 0.000  
Variables are defined as follows: 
gt = Unrecorded goodwill per share at the 3 months after the balance sheet date t. 
ox
a
t = Abnormal operating earnings per share at the balance sheet date t. 
oat = Operating assets per share at the balance sheet date t. 
Dk = Dummy variable which is 1 for the aggressive firm-years and 0 otherwise. 
Note: t-statistics are tested at the significance level of 0.05 using two-tailed tests. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
Because prior studies on life-cycle have not considered the role of accounting procedure choice in firm 
valuation, the findings of those studies are not generalizable to firms following different accounting procedures. Using 
accounting valuation model proposed by Feltham and Ohlson [1995], this paper examines firm valuation attributable 
to (1) the effects of life-cycle stages and (2) the join effects of accounting conservatism and life-cycle stages. The 
results show that accounting conservatism affects the relationship between life-cycle stage and firm valuation.  This 
chapter discusses the implications of those results. 
 
The empirical evidences reject all the null hypotheses.  This study finds that the market evaluates accounting 
information differently for firms at different life-cycle stages and accounting conservatism affects the relationship 
between life-cycle stage and firm valuation. Investors price higher (lower) for the GROWTH (DECLINE) firms using 
conservative accounting practices than firms using less conservative practices. For GROWTH firms, although 
conservative accounting practices reduce current earnings, the increased hidden reserves resulting from conservatism 
enable the accounting information to be informative. The result shows that investors bestow high multiple to 
decreasing earnings. For MATURE firms, accounting conservatism is not likely to affect investors’ firm valuation in 
terms of abnormal operating earnings. On the other hand, DECLINE firms following conservative accounting that 
increase current earnings would make them poor indicators of future earnings. The evidence shows that the market 
assigns low weight to those temporarily increasing earnings. 
 
Prior research on life-cycle stage (Anthony and Ramesh [1992] and Black [1998]) offers no directional 
relation between accounting information and life-cycle stage. Using FO model, this study provides directional 
hypotheses about the effect of life-cycle stage on value-relevance of accounting information. The results show that 
value-relevance of accounting information changes at different life-cycle stages and it is consistent with the results of 
Skinner [1993]. He finds that a firm’s investments opportunity set relates to accounting procedure choices, even after 
controlling for managers’ compensation schemes that are presumed to affect managers’ choices of particular 
accounting procedures. In summary, this study contributes to the accounting valuation literature by providing evidence 
on the differential value-relevance of accounting information for firms using different accounting measurement rules at 
different life-cycle stages.   
 
This study provides evidences that researches on accounting conservatism or life-cycle stage should take into 
consideration the different effects of accounting conservatism at different life-cycle stages.  As an example, it is 
expected that the effect of conservative accounting choices on firm value will not be great in a study consisting mostly 
of firms at decline stage. In contrast, the result might be different if the sample firms are mostly at the growth stage. 
One of the motivations for this paper was to provide evidence concerning the extent to which the FO model is 
consistent with the data used in this paper by considering all the primary inputs (abnormal earnings, operating assets, 
and other information) to the FO model. This empirical test of the FO valuation model can provide evidence on its 
validity, which has been assumed in prior studies using FO model, and illustrate properties of it which would be 
valuable for future research. 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1
 Ahmed et al. [1999] use accelerated depreciation, LIFO, R&D expenditure, and advertising expenditure as proxies 
for accounting conservatism, and they find a significant relation between these proxies and the persistence and 
conservatism multiples in the FO valuation model. 
2
 Basu [1997] defines accounting conservatism as the asymmetric accounting practice utilized in response to news 
whereby conservative firms write down net assets and reduce accounting earnings in response to “bad news” but not 
write up net assets and increase accounting earnings in response to “good news”. Recognizing bad news or delaying 
the recognition of good news is also likely to result in under-valuation of net operating assets. 
3
 The Institute of Management Accountants [1986, p. 13] argues “[a]t each stage of growth in an entity’s life cycle, 
different measures of financial performance take on varying degrees of importance. Therefore, neither growth nor 
net income nor cash flows nor return on investment should be emphasized to the exclusion of other meaningful 
measures.” 
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4
 The first assumption is consistent with the observation that many firms use accounting measures such as return on 
investment (ROI) for performance evaluation and resource allocation (Anthony and Ramesh [1992]). 
5
 Basically, this paper assumes that the market is efficient with respect to publicly available information. 
6
 The following are among the examples of conservative accounting practices: (1) providing conservative LIFO 
accounting for inventories relative to FIFO, (2) expensing research and development (R&D) expenditures rather 
than capitalizing and amortizing them, (3) accelerating depreciation methods and/or using short estimated asset lives, 
and (4) maintaining policies that consistently estimate high allowances for doubtful accounts, sales returns or 
warranty liabilities. 
7
 The literature on manipulation of accounting principles or accounting estimates to manage reported earnings is 
extensive. However, in this paper, given an accounting policy applied consistently over time, earnings are assumed 
to be affected by change in investments. By calculating the average comprehensive conservatism index over four 
years (i.e., from –1 to –4 prior to event year), this paper minimizes the effects of those temporary conservative 
practices. 
8
 In the FO model, growth positively affects firm value because the multiple on net operating assets, ,, increases as 
growth rate, 22, increases. 
9
 Intuitively, growth combined with conservative accounting makes it more difficult to recognize high earnings and 
hence the earnings will look more sustainable in the future. 
10
 However, if a firm beliefs that the market misinterprets the implication of its accounting policy or the change in 
investment activities, it will try to correct such misinterpretation through voluntary disclosures. 
11
 Large earnings or net assets do not necessarily lead to the maximization of firm value.  Investment in capacity 
expansion at the wrong stage of a life cycle can lead to excess capacity and reduced profitability. Therefore, the 
joint-effects of conservative accounting and expected growth are expected to have different impacts on market 
prices at different life-cycle stages. 
12
 In order to ensure that the empirical results are not driven by a single classification variable, a multivariate 
classification method is performed using quintiles of each life-cycle indicator. 
13
 The score of 5 (1) is assigned for a firm-year with sales growth in the top (bottom) quintile of industry, capital 
expenditures ranked in the top (bottom) quintile of industry, dividend payout in the bottom (top) quintile of industry, 
and firm age ranked in the bottom (top) quintile of industry. 
14
 Because of limitations in data availability, this paper estimates firm-specific conservatism with a relatively short 
period (-1 to -4). The impact of conservatism on abnormal earnings is predicted to revert to the mean quickly, so it is 
reasonable to estimate conservatism parameters over the relatively short period. 
15
 63% of overall sample firms are conservative in comparison to the industry average.  However, the number of 
conservative firms is similar over the different voluntary disclosure strata (see Panel C of Table 1). 
16
 If two firms are merged, the years in which the two firms were originally incorporated are compared and the earlier 
of them is used in computing AGE. 
17
 Numbers in parentheses refer to COMPUSTAT data items. 
18
 The financial classification variables (i.e., sales growth, capital expenditures, and dividend payout) are directly 
related to firm risk, so firms sorted on these variables could have a differential response to accounting measures, 
even without life-cycle considerations (Anthony and Ramesh [1992]). To minimize the effects of possible 
correlation of risk with life-cycle stage, firm age is used as a nonfinancial classification variable. 
19
 These sampling criteria are similar to those of Lang and Lundholm [1993] and Healy et al. [1995]. Since the 
calculation of CRR requires a 5-year window (+2 to –2), event years analyzed in this study will be from 1984 to 
1991. 
20
 The stock price data are adjusted for stock splits and dividends.  Including COMPUSTAT research data can reduce 
the self-selection bias from survivorship. 
21
 Like prior research on life-cycle, this study uses multiple descriptors to reduce misclassification problem from a 
univariate classification.  For instance, when a firm shows low dividend payout, multivariate classification can 
preclude misclassification of firms with liquidity problems that are not growth firms by considering other life-cycle 
stage descriptors (Black 1998). 
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22
 Investors might put different weights on different life-cycle indicators.  However as Anthony and Ramesh [1992] 
point out, it is difficult to measure different weights on each indicator.  This paper assumes that four descriptors are 
equally weighted by investors. 
23
 Although sample firms selected in this study are restricted to those with AIMR scores, the classification of life-cycle 
stage can be applied to any other firms by doing a comparison with the industry quintile. 
24
 This paper follows the variable definitions of Stober [1995] who view preferred stock and minority interest as debt, 
while treating deferred taxes and net pension assets as net operating assets. All variables used in the FO model are 
scaled by common shares outstanding (#25).  Numbers in parentheses refer to the COMPUSTAT data item. 
25
 This paper uses the annualized three-month Treasury Bill rate plus a risk-premium of 4% as a proxy for the cost of 
capital. Since Fama and French [1992] indicate that firm-specific risk factor (i.e., β) explains little of the cross-
sectional variation in stock price, this paper treats the cost of capital as cross-sectionally constant. 
26
 This study examines the t-statistics based on White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected covariance matrix, and fails to 
find any changes in the significance of t-statistics. The presence of significant autocorrelation in the residuals is also 
checked using the Durbin-Watson test. There is no evidence of significant autocorrelation in the residuals. 
27
 The adjusted R
2
 is .657, which is much higher than the value of adjusted R
2
 found usually in earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) model. ERC model concerns only accounting earnings while the FO model incorporates both 
abnormal earnings and book value. 
